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HONESTY, PRIVACY, AND SHAME:
WHEN GAY PEOPLE TALK ABOUT OTHER GAY-
PEOPLE TO NONGAY PEOPLE
DavidL. Chambers*
Steven K ffomer**
'What is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the housetops."'
There is a longstanding convention among lesbians and gay men'
in the United States: Do not reveal the sexuality of a gay person to a
heterosexual person; unless you are certain that the gay person does
not regard his sexuality as a secret. Lie if necessary to protect her se-
cret. Violating the convention by "outing" another person is widely
considered a serious social sin.
Many gay people view the convention as protecting closeted gay
people's right of privacy. A few reject it as resting on outmoded, even
harmful, notions that it is shameful to be gay. This essay describes the
convention in operation and its justification in an era in which more
and more gay people believe that the most important agent for re-
ducing both officially sanctioned and private intolerance toward gay
people is to increase the number of people known to be gay.
The outing of politicians and celebrities in gay magazines and
other news media has been written about extensively elsewhere.3
Our subject is somewhat different. We write about the convention
as it applies in the context of conversations between individuals
about acquaintances, friends, and the person next door. We focus
on the outing of ordinary people by other ordinary people because
* Wade H. McCree, Jr., Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School. AB., 1962, Princeton University; LLB., 1965, Harvard Law School.
** Member of the New Mexico bar. A.B., 1991, University of Chicago; J.D., 1994,
Harvard Law School.
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privay, 4 -HAy. L. REv. 193,
195 (1890).
2. We use the term "gay person" and "lesbians and gay men" as a loose shorthand for all
those whose sexual attractions are not limited to persons of the opposite sex.
3. See generally LARtv GRoss, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE PoLInCS AND ETHICS OF
OUTING (1993); MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, QUEER IN AMERiCA: SEX, THE MEDIA,
AND THE CLOSETS OF PoWER (1994).
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the day-to-day lies openly gay people tell to protect friends and ac-
quaintances often place the tellers in a personal ethical quandary.
Moreover, in cumulative effect these little lies seriously limit the
number of persons known to be gay. We conclude that the conven-
tional notions of "rights" and "privacy" are not helpful in thinking
about the issues outing poses. We also conclude, however, that for
now gay people should continue to adhere to the convention of si-
lence. Honesty is not yet the best policy. A wiser policy at this point is
for openly gay people to press closeted gay people more aggressively to
reveal themselves as gay.
The Story of Oliver Sipple
We begin with the story of a celebrated outing of a person who,
up to nearly that moment, had not been celebrated, who had simply
been the acquaintance, the friend, the person next door.4 On Septem-
ber 22, 1975, Oliver Sipple joined a crowd in Union Square in San
Francisco, waiting to catch a glimpse of President Gerald R. Ford
when the President visited the city. As Ford approached, Sipple saw a
woman step out of the crowd and aim a gun. Just as she fired, Sipple
struck her arm and, by doing so, probably saved the President from
serious injury or death. Sipple was treated as a hero in the contempo-
rary news accounts of the event.'
Sipple was gay. He was an energetic member of San Francisco's
growing gay community. He had worked on the campaigns of both
Harvey Milk for city supervisor and Mike Caringi for gay "Emperor"
of San Francisco. He had marched in gay pride parades in San Fran-
cisco and in other cities. He had been mentioned and photographed
in several gay newspapers in connection with his activities. Dozens of
gay friends in San Francisco and other large cities knew he was gay.
He was not, however, known to be gay by his biological family or het-
erosexual friends back in Texas where he had grown up.
On the day after the assassination attempt, someone in the San
Francisco gay community violated the convention of silence. Proud of
Sipple's heroism, this person called Herb Caen, a San Francisco
Chronicle columnist, and told him that Sipple was gay. The next day,
Caen published a column reporting that after the shooting "'Sipple
4. The facts we report are drawn from the opinion in Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co.,
201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
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... was the center of midnight attention at the Red Lantern, a Golden
Gate Ave. bar he favors."" Caen also reported conversations with
Milk and another leader of the gay community, the Rev. Ray
Broshears, in which both "claim[ed] to be among Sipple's close
friends."6 Milk and Broshears, said Caen, described themselves as
"'"proud-maybe this will help break the stereotype."' 7 Other
newspapers picked up on Caen's column, some reporting that Presi-
dent Ford had failed to thank Sipple promptly and speculating that
the failure might have been due to Sipple's sexual orientation. Eventu-
ally, through these accounts, Sipple's family and friends in Texas
discovered his homosexuality before he was ready for them to learn of
it.
Sipple's story is both unusual and common. The usual occasions
for the convention are more mundane. Three elements of Sipple's un-
usual story are nonetheless common. First, someone who is gay
revealed another gay person's sexuality. Second, though the revealer
wished to cause no harm, some harmful consequences arose from the
revelation. (Sipple believed they were disastrous; he claimed that after
the news traveled to his parents and siblings, they "abandoned" him,
causing him great distress.)8 Third, Sipple was angry about the public
revelation of his sexuality; to him, the revelation was not simply
harmful, it was wrongful.
Sipple in fact was so offended by the revelation that he sued the
newspaper.9 For our purposes, it would be a better story if he had also
sued the gay person who informed the newspaper. However, the lan-
guage Sipple invoked in his lawsuit was the same language that gay
people use in day-to-day conversations about individual gay-people's
violations of the convention: Sipple sued the Chronicle for a breach of
his "right of privacy." He claimed that the 'fact that he was
"homosexual in his personal and private sexual orientation" were
"private facts" that the newspaper was prohibited from revealing with-
out his consent.1°
On its face, there is something anomalous about Sipple's indig-
nant reaction. It is difficult to understand how a person who engages
5. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
6. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
7. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
8. See Sippk, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
9. See Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. 667.
10. Sippk, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
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in such a wide range of public activities, activities known to hundreds
of people, could feel wounded when someone truthfully reports about
those activities. And yet he did. Even now, though twenty tumultuous
years have passed since the Sipple incident, many gay people still feel
aggrieved when their sexuality is revealed by another gay person. Like
Sipple, they live bifurcated lives: they are known as gay by large num-
bers of other gay people, but not by theit biological families or by
heterosexuals among whom they live and work. They expect other gay
people to help them sustain their secret, and it is the gay community's
adherence to this convention of secrecy that makes it possible for so
many gay people to sustain these separate spheres.
I. THE CONVENTION OF SILENCE
We can find no empirical research on the degree to which gay
people actually adhere to a convention of silence and deception or on
the ways they honor or evade it. We report here simply on the con-
vention as we understand it from our own experiences, from
conversations with others about their experiences, and from the writ-
ings of others about their own experiences of the convention. When
we use the term "convention," we mean an expected pattern of be-
havior"--expected both in the sense that the behavior is predictable
and anticipated and in the sense that it is required as a matter of good
manners or good morals. Among gay people, silence about the sexual-
ity of others is thus "expected" in much the same way that two people
each "expect" the other to show up when they have agreed to meet at a
certain time.
To understand the convention in common operation, consider
Oliver Sipple in a more ordinary context than the celebrated event for
which he is known. If a lesbian acquaintance of his, call her Paula, saw
Sipple at a gay pride parade and later talked to a straight friend of
Sipple's, the convention would require Paula to keep silent about any
information that might lead to inferences about Sipple's sexuality. If
Sipple's name came up in the conversation, Paula might have to lie:
"No, I haven't seen him lately." Or, if she were quick enough, she
might be truthful but misleading or incomplete: "Yes, I bumped into
him on the street a few weeks ago." In certain circumstances, Paula
11. See DAVID K. LIIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969).
[Vol. 4:255
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might even be called upon to dissemble about her own sexuality. If,
for example, Paula and Sipple were talking on a street corner and a
colleague of Sipple's from work joined them, Paula might try to pass
as straight or avoid gay topics in order not to implicate Sipple by asso-
ciation. In other circumstances, when Paula encountered Sipple with
others and saw that Sipple was trying to avoid her eye, she might even
pretend not to know him. She would walk by, invisible.
The convention adds to already existing social rules and conven-
tions about secrecy that apply to all people, gay and straight.
Participants in groups such as twelve-step programs, for example,
agree to maintain confidentiality about anything said during meetings.
We also honor more general conventions that oblige us to keep our
promises to individuals when we have explicitly agreed not to reveal
something. Friendship, less explicitly, imposes such constraints in the
name of loyalty. Because we know our friends well, we will often be
able to make good judgments about what they would like to have said
about them, even in the absence of specific promises-not just about
their sexuality but also about other subjects such as their health or
their finances. The convention of silence about sexuality applies in all
these contexts, but, for gay people, it applies more broadly to include
people with whom we do not share any of these relationships, people
with whom we have made no agreements nor formed any bonds of
friendship.' 2
The convention demonstrates the radical asymmetry that exists
between the lives of gay people and heterosexuals; it is the asymmetry
between what may be told and what must be hidden. A discreet hetero-
sexual person would not, under normal circumstances, reveal
information that a heterosexual friend finds embarrassing. A discreet
gay person keeps silent in addition about that which is (or ought to
be) most joyful. A gay person who was Sipple's friend would not have
told straight people about the celebration at the Red Lantern, or even
about more everyday information about a wonderful new boyfriend in
12. The application of this (or any) convention to these classes of people is directly re-
lated to the conceptualization of homosexuality as an identity one can "be," even
when not having sex, which (certain mythical gay men of the 1970s excepted) is most
of the time for most of us. Thus, whatever conventions govern kissing and telling, we
have come to find ourselves "being gay" or "being lesbian" around other people in
contexts in which but for the convention there would be no special expectations
about secrecy.
1997]
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Sipple's life. Even our best news must often be concealed from hetero-
sexuals.
While there is no written code of the convention or any common
law of exceptions, we suspect that even those who honor it in its full-
est form believe that it is permissible to disclose the homosexuality of
other people regardless of their probable wishes when the harms of
silence are sufficiently great. (We mean harm greater than that of
complicity with homophobia, which is always present in honoring the
convention and about which we will have more to say.) If, for exam-
ple, a closeted male supervisor sexually harasses or sexually assaults :i
male employee who is openly gay, the employee will need to reveal
facts about the offender's behavior and apparent orientation if he
seeks relief through a disciplinary process or criminal prosecution.
Few would demand that the victim respect the supervisor's wish not
to be out. A circumstance such as this, however, is rare enough that it
does not diminish the otherwise widespread applicability of the rule;"
in the great majority of other occasions it is considered inappropriate
to reveal a person as gay or lesbian to nongay people.
The convention as commonly practiced does not, however, apply
to discussing a person's sexual orientation with lesbians or gay men,
especially with close friends. 4 Indeed, gay persons often expect their
friends to share such information." Sharing permits the forming of
social or romantic connections and helps gay people recognize that
they are part of a larger community. Gay people generally withhold
information from gay friends only when they have explicitly promised
to, when they fear that the friend will be indiscreet and reveal the
third person's sexuality to inappropriate others, or when they regard
13. There are even'rarer occasions in which it would be appropriate to out someone even
if the closeted person has done no harm. Karen Thompson surely acted appropriately
in revealing the sexuality of her partner Sharon Kowalski after an accident that left
Sharon brain damaged and unable 'to communicate, since outing Sharon was neces-
sary in order to enable Karen to assert herself as Sharon's appropriate caretaker. See
KAREN THOMPSON & JuLm ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON Kow:ALsm COME
HOME? (1988).
14. A lesbian friend, Mary Dunlap, read this piece in draft and wrote us that she would
never reveal the sexuality of a closeted person even to another lesbian, without the
closeted person's consent. We do not know how many others exercise the same de-
gree of restraint, but we believe that Mary is in the minority.
15. See JAMES D. WOODS, wITH JAY H. Luc4s, THE CORPORATE CLOSET" THE PRoPas-
sIoNAL LrvEs OF GAY MEN m AMERICA 122 (1994).
[Vol. 4:255
HONESTY, PRIVACY, AND SHAME
revealing the information to be gossip that would violate their per-
sonal standards of behavior.'6
We have stated the convention in a broad form: Don't reveal the
identity of gay people to heterosexuals unless you are certain that the
gay person would not object. In the process of writing this piece, we
have learned that this view of the convention does not fully describe
actual practice today even among gay people who think of themselves
as discreet and protective. For example, one writer who has recently
defended the convention of silence reports with apparent approval
that some lesbians today talk openly about other lesbians to hetero-
sexual women with whom they are close, trusting the heterosexual
women's discretion. 17 Others who live in academic settings in large
cities have told us about feeling free to tell their supportive heterosex-
ual friends, both male and female, about closeted persons. They trust
these friends not to inflict harms and not to tell others who might do
so. In addition, many of us who are gay probably make assumptions
that some particular gay acquaintances are out in general without
taking care to confirm that it is actually so. Thus, when we know that
a particular person is gay and also know that he works at a bar in the
Castro in San Francisco or dances professionally in a ballet company
or runs an AIDS service organization, we may guess that he is out to
the world and talk about him to our heterosexual friends without ad-
verting to the slight possibility that we would be revealing a secret.
Eventually, perhaps, the convention may disappear because all
straight people will be supportive or nonthreatening; but this is not
the case now. A considerable majority of Americans still believes that
all forms of same-sex sexual and romantic behavior are immoral.'8 In
small towns throughout America like the Texas town where Oliver
Sipple grew up, few people may feel ready today for any but the firm-
16. Avoiding gossip is a problematic reason for concealing information about another
person's sexuality. Gossip is, after all, information about a person that he or she
probably would not want reported because it usually has an illicit edge, a "psst" at-
tached to it. It is because homosexuality is stigmatized that talking about it can be
experienced as gossip. Revealing in a whispered tone that someone was born in De-
cember or likes to eat applesauce typically fails as gossip.
17. See Claudia Card, Other People's Secrets: The Ethics of Outing in LESBIAN CHOIcEs
(1995). Card would reveal information to straight women in circumstances under
which she would not speak to a gay male friend. See Card, supra at 215.
18. According to surveys conducted in 1991 and 1992, 65 to 72% of Americans believe
that sexual relations between adults of the same sex are always wrong. See EDWARD 0.
L4umANN, ET At., THE SocIAL ORGANIZA-bON O SaxuAtrrv 599 tbl. B.4 (1994).
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est rule of silence. 9 In this essay we ultimately and reluctantly defend
silence, but begin by exploring its costs.
II. THE HARMS OF THE CONVENTION
The convention of silence and dissembling evolved at a time
when gay and lesbian persons could almost never safely acknowledge
their sexuality to persons who were not also gay or lesbian. At that
time, the convention was largely self-enforcing because gay persons
who revealed the sexuality of other gay persons risked revealing them-
selves. Moreover, at that time, to a greater extent than today, silence
was reinforced by shame: the great majority of gay men and lesbians
accepted the judgment that being homosexual was pathologic or sinful
or both.
But life is different today for growing numbers of lesbians and
gay men. Many are out (often after many years in hiding) and the
convention imposes burdensome costs. First, and for some of us most
significantly, the convention demands that we lie. For many people,
lying of any sort about matters of importance offends deeply held per-
sonal values. For many who have come out, lying about the sexuality
of others carries special pain because it reminds them of the lying they
did about their own sexuality for so many years and that they are re-
lieved to have left behind. They accept who they are and hate
tiptoeing around when speaking of their friends. For others, after a
life of practice, the lying still comes easily and carries no cost of which
they are conscious, but may nevertheless subtly revive the self-hate
they have worked to get beyond.
Richard Mohr, a gay man and libertarian philosopher, believes
that this corrosion of self-respect is at the heart of what is wrong with
the convention. 0 In his view, the convention of secrecy is "the social
convention that most centrally defines the community" of lesbians
and gay men in the United States, and he believes it must be dis-
carded.2' Every time gay men and lesbians obey the convention, he
claims, they ratify the view of most heterosexuals that gay people are
19. See generally FARM Boys: LiVEs OF GAY MEN FROM THE Rumi, MIDWEST (Will Fel-
lows ed., 1996).
20. See RicHARD D. MOHR, The Outing Controversy: Privacy and Dignity in Gay Ethics, in
GAY IDEAS: OTING AND OTHER CoTRovsIEs 11-48 (1994).
21. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 29.
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loathsome and disgusting, and they cater to heterosexuals' desire that
gay people remain invisible. Concealing for others undermines the
concealer's sense of dignity and self-respect.
Mohr prizes the person who "lives in the truth" by refusing to
conceal her own sexuality or the sexuality of others. The truth teller's
dignity, he argues, is more than the dignity of not telling lies; it is the
dignity of affirming the worthiness of being gay.? Mohr believes that
the openly gay person's interest in dignity would trump the interests
of the closeted person in almost every case.24
Mohr greatly overstates the case against the convention. Lesbians
and gay men may lie or keep silent about friends and acquaintances
for reasons other than the belief that we are loathsome and disgusting.
Mohr is correct, however, that concealing the homosexuality of an-
other person is not a cost-free social maneuver for the openly gay or
lesbian person: it checks us on occasions when we might say some-
thing positive about the lives of our gay and lesbian friends, and
simultaneously suppresses the value of certain aspects of our own lives.
For Paula to follow the convention and lie to protect Oliver Sipple
would not mean that she accepted that being gay was "loathsome,"
but it would devalue her homosexual identity. At its worst, on occa-
sions when nongay people realize that we avoid talking about other
gay people in front of them, we reinforce their belief that being gay is
embarrassing or demeaning, regardless of our own views about it.
Thus, the convention causes other harms. When a young gay per-
son knows an older, financially successful gay person who is closeted
at work, the younger person may falsely conclude that her own success
will depend on remaining closeted. In the workplace the closeted em-
ployee may even actively impede the openness of other gay employees.
James Woods, in his study of the workplace entitled The Corporate
Closet, relates how closeted male co-workers seek to protect themselves
by encouraging other gay employees to be less open, how they shun
gay colleagues instead of providing helpful mentoring, and how they
sometimes discriminate against lesbians and gay men in hiring and
promotion decisions.25
22. MOR, supra note 20, at 37-39.
23. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 40-43.
24. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 40-43.
25. See WOODS, supra note 15, at 127-32; see also GRoss, supra note 3, at 45 (quoting
writer Armistead Maupin on enforced secrecy among gay celebrities).
1997]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Other harms caused by the convention are more general. Poll
data suggest that the sympathy and support of nongay people for gay
men and lesbians, and specifically for legal protections of their rights,
increase when they know gay or lesbian people. 6 By concealing the
identity of our gay friends and acquaintances, we preserve a world in
which large numbers of persons are unaware that they know anyone
who is lesbian or gay. And because being out is, in the end, our prin-
cipal political strategy, a convention catering to the closeted individual
conflicts with our efforts to promote outness generally.
Thus, the convention does impose some harms, but it does not
necessarily follow that abandoning it would eliminate them. If openly
gay people refused to conceal their closeted acquaintances, the number
of people known to be gay would surely increase, but the increase
might only be temporary. Ending the convention might make many
closeted lesbians and gay men even more vigilant about hiding. They
might never make the first contacts with other gay people that would
lead, eventually, to their coming out voluntarily to the world in gen-
eral. In addition, outing those who are unwilling to be out might also
backfire in cases in which the outed person is mired in self-doubt and
displays the very sense of shame that heterosexuals expect. Forced
outing could thus fail to generate the positive change that might be
hoped for in the attitudes of others.
While it is possible that abandoning the convention could have
this silencing effect, we believe it is more probable that perpetuating
the convention itself keeps the number of known gay men and lesbi-
ans artificially low. When we follow the convention we permit
closeted lesbians and gay men to remain in a "safe" environment; the
larger the community of people who are out, the easier and more
comfortable it is for others to come out as well. Additionally, as more
and more people come out, the convention becomes overly conserva-
tive even to serve its own goals: because it applies whenever we do not
know for certain that a gay person is out, it causes us to construct
closets for some people who may actually be willing or eager to be
known. More fundamentally, our guess is that many lesbians and gay
men who really are closeted would still search out others like them-
selves even if they knew that there was no convention of secrecy. After
26. See discussion of studies in Susan Becker, The Immorality of Publicly Outing Private
People, 73 Op. L. Rnv. 159, 208-11 (1994) (discussing the theory that "being out
creates tolerance").
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all, for decades men and women have visited gay bars for the first time
without knowing that any convention of silence existed.
III. WHY SOME CONVENTION IS NEEDED
Among gay people, the most common defense of the convention
has been that it protects every gay individual's "right of privacy," a right
to keep personal information to oneself, or, more accurately perhaps, a
right to control the dissemination of information about oneself Thus,
a recently published book of "gay manners and etiquette" instructs the
gay reader that "outing a colleague-intentionally or unintention-
ally-is a violation of that person's privacy. Don't do it!"27 Columnist
Mike Royko of the Chicago Tribune has argued that "if a secret homo-
sexual's home is his castle, his closet is a nook in his castle, and if he
doesn't want to be dragged out of his closet, that's his right."
28
In our view, reliance on the language of privacy to criticize re-
vealing homosexuality distorts a sensible view of what privacy is all
about and muddies rather than illuminates the issues at hand.29 The
closet is a metaphor, not a place.3" A public revelation is a violation of
a right of privacy when the information is obtained in illegal or intru-
sive ways that a society wishes not to countenance-for example, by
hidden cameras or the like. But this is not what has happened in most
situations in which gay persons discover and then reveal the sexuality
of another gay person. In Sipple's case and in most cases, gay people
who "out" other gay people have come to know about the person's
sexuality because they have observed something in a perfectly lawful
and nonfurtive manner: they saw, the closeted person at a dance or a
bar or a Pride Parade or talked with others who had observed the clos-
eted person in such circumstances. When a person engages in open
behavior such as this, it is peculiar to argue that he or she then has a
27. STEVEN Pamow wrm NICK STEELE, THE ESSENTIAL BOOK OF GAY MANNERS AND
ETIQUETrE 28 (1995).
28. Mike Royko, Antsy Closet Crowd Should Think Twice, CI. TRaB., Apr. 2, 1990, § 1,
at 3, reprinted in GRoss, supra note 3, at 227.
29. For similar condusions, see MOHR, supra note 20 at 18; SIGNORULE, supra note 3, at
79-80.
30. For discussions of the multiple meanings and functions of the term "closer," see EVE
KosoFsK SEDGWICK, EpISTEMoLOGy OF THE CLOSET 3, 67-90 (1990); Kenji
Yoshino, Suspect Symbol: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96
COLUm. L Rav. 1753, 1794-1802 (1996).
1997]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
moral claim or "right" to keep others who observed or heard it from
talking about it. Where exactly would such a right come from? One
might argue that the right originates in the convention itself-the
closeted person is entitled to rely on expectations created by the
custom of secrecy. Such an argument is problematic, however, as
applied to any particular gay person who has never chosen to sub-
scribe to the convention and who may never have relied on its
shelter; it is unacceptable as a justification for retaining an otherwise
unsatisfactory convention into the future.
Claims of an invasion of his right to privacy were nonetheless
precisely what Oliver Sipple relied upon when he sued the San Fran-
cisco Chronicle." A California trial judge found a basis in state law for
the tort of invasion of privacy and said that the tort applied to the in-
appropriate disclosure of "private facts."32 The Court then rejected
Sipple's claim because Sipple had failed to prove that the facts re-
vealed had been previously concealed from view.' The tort, the court
held, did not apply to "information about the plaintiff which is al-
ready public" or that "relates to matters which the plaintiff leaves
open to the public eye."m The Chronicle, the court found, had merely
reported behavior that was already known to hundreds of others.
Sipple and other gay people who speak about privacy may none-
theless be using the word in another sense. Sipple did not deny that he
had revealed his sexuality to many people, but he seemed to assert a
permanent right to control information about what additional people
would learn. These claims for controlling information about one's
sexuality sound similar to claims for controlling access to one's own
body. Just as a woman who has intercourse with many men never
loses the right to determine with whom she has sex in the future, so a
lesbian, the argument runs, may reveal her sexuality to whomever she
31. See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
32. For a formulation of the tort as accepted in several states, see ESATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(A) (1989); Harry Kalven, Jr., Pivacy in Tort Lau-Were
Warren andBrandeis Wrong?, LAw & CoNTmp. PROBS. 326 (1966).
33. For two recent articles arguing that there should be relief for outing in tort actions
based on unjustified intrusion into privacy, see Katheleen Guzman, About Outing:
Public Discourse, Private Lives, 73 WASH. U.LQ. 1531, 1583-92 (1995); Ronald F.
Wick, Out ofthe Closet and Into the Headlines: "Outing and the Pdvate Facts Tort, 80
GEo. LJ. 413 (1991). Both Guzman and Wick focus on outings that involve the
news media, not outings by private citizens engaged in ordinary conversation.
34. Sip , 201 Cal. Rptr. 201 at 669.
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pleases, but never lose her right to determine the additional people
who learn of her sexuality. This claim has some rhetorical force, but
information is distinguishable from our bodies. What we tell people
or show people commonly becomes an appropriate subject of public
discourse unless we negotiate an agreement of secrecy. Heterosexual
people care about protecting their bodies, but do not assume that
their heterosexuality is information that others cannot discuss without
their consent.
Still, even if neither of these uses of the notion of privacy is per-
suasive in defending the convention of silence, it does not follow that
the convention is unsupportable. "Privacy," loosely used, may well
encode other concerns that are entitled to weight. Among the many
reasons advanced for the practice of following the convention, two
reasons-closely related to each other and indirectly related to the
goals behind recognizing interests of privacy-strike us as compelling
across a broad range of cases. First, the convention attempts to protect
closeted gay men and lesbians from the harms that other people inflict
on people known to be gay or lesbian, and second, it attempts to per-
mit each person to choose when to come out.
A. Protecting Gay People From Harm
Claudia Card, a lesbian and philosopher, disagrees with Mohr's
contention that the convention is indefensible, and accepts the con-
vention on the ground that it helps shield gay people from the harms
that other people impose.35 She acknowledges that the convention is
bleak and sinister, "when a requirement of secrecy would be justified
only were the secret shameful, compliance conveys that the secret is
shameful, however unintended the message."3 6 But unlike Mohr, she
reluctantly defends the convention because of the numerous harms
that women and men still suffer when known to be lesbian or gay.
Susan Becker, a lesbian and law professor, also defends the conven-
tion, devoting nearly the first half of a seventy-page article on the
immorality of outing to the harms that lesbians and gay men continue
to suffer when their sexuality becomes known.3 We agree with Card
and Becker: all gay men and lesbians know that in many places and in
35. See Card, supra note 17, at 206.
36. Card, supra note 17, at 200.
37. See Becker, supra note 26, at 166-97.
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many contexts in our society to be known as a homosexual is at least a
disqualification and sometimes leads to violence. Even today, twenty
years after Sipple's act of heroism, many young people who come out
are rejected by their parents. When revealed, some gay people lose
their jobs, their housing, or even the custody of their children. Many
are beaten up and some lose their lives. Even gay people who do not
fear specific harms themselves may choose not to disclose the homo-
sexuality of other people out of a desire not to be the one who puts
those other people in harm's way. They may gladly risk whatever costs
come with being out, but hesitate to impose the same risk on others.
Mohr argues that a fear that closeted gays and lesbians might be
subject to various harms is not a sound reason for refusing to out
them."8 In his view, the person morally culpable for any harms that
occur is not the person who speaks the truth but the person who uses
the information to inflict harm. Thus, though he disapproves of re-
vealing a person's sexuality for unseemly reasons (for example, to get
even for some slight), he writes that he would not shrink from being
honest about the sexuality of a lesbian who was involved in a custody
dispute over her child, even if he knew that to do so would cost her
custody; the wrongdoer would be the judge who inappropriately
deemed her unfit.39 In his view, the mother's assertion of an interest in
parenting "that is dependent on upholding or giving effective voice to
the prejudices of others-... will not count toward an exception to
outing." °
Mohr's position is monstrous. Losing custody is both a grave and
an all-too-common consequence of being identified as lesbian. The
mother (and her child) may have no formal "right" to our silence, but
it does not follow that we are behaving decently in exposing them to
the viciousness of others. Indeed, it seems that allowing the parent and
child to be separated solely because of the mother's lesbianism gives a
highly effective voice to a force that degrades gay men and lesbians.
Mohr can Come to his position on outing only by viewing gay
and lesbian persons as independent actors solely concerned with their
38. See MOHR, supra note 20, at 34.
39. See MoHR, supra note 20, at 34. Mohr concedes that it would be wrong to reveal a
person's homosexuality if the government were engaged in a pogrom of killing lesbi-
ans or gay men, but then offers no explanation for the difference in principle in
revealing the gay or lesbian parent who faces wrongfully losing his or her child. See
MOHR, supra note 20, at 34.
40. MOHR, supra note 20, at 34.
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and a recognition of a common fate-not a fate of his choosing, to be
sure, but a fate dictated by the culture in which we live. And it is this
common fate that should make us-and Mohr-more sympathetic to
the harms that she may face, whether or not she has any "right" to his
protection.
B. Permitting Gay Persons to Choose When to Come Out
A second reason to follow the convention of silence is to allow
people to control the timing of their coming out. The convention
permits lesbians and gay men to decide when they are ready to face
the costs that are likely to follow from being identified as gay and al-
lows them to experience the satisfaction of taking the step. Hunter
Madsen argues that "[w] e must cherish the process of coming out. No
gay person should deny another the incomparable, irreplaceable, once-
in-a-lifetime opportunity to come out of the closet under his or her
own steam, as the fruit of deep personal reflection, courage and con-
viction.""4 Madsen makes coming out a little more thrilling than most
of us found it. Still, many men and women report great satisfaction in
having made and acted upon the choice to come out. A recent story in
the University of Maine alumni magazine offers an everyday example
of the essential soundness of Madsen's point. An undergraduate at the
university, who was a member of ROTC, acknowledged to himself
that he was gay and slowly made himself known to a few other gay
students. Ultimately, he informed his commanding officer and now
says of himself "Today I'm free.... It's a wonderful feeling. No more
dark secrets." 42 On his way to making that statement, he relied on
what he called a "code of silence" in the gay community: "Everyone
knew I was in ROTC and that I was struggling to come to grips with
41. Hunter Madsen, Tattle Tale Traps, OutWvEK, May 16, 1990, reprinted in GRoss,
supra note 3, at 237. Similarly, Vito Russo has argued that "'the act of coming out is
a personal political act, [and] it loses its value unless you know why you're doing it.
You have to have the courage to do it on your own; otherwise, what does it mean?'"
quoted in Stuart Byron, Naming Names, ADvocAm, Apr. 24, 1990, at 37, reprinted
in GRoss, supra note 3, at 233. See also David Tuller, Uproar over Gays Booting Oth-
ers Out of the Closet, SAN FRANcIsco CHRON., March 12, 1990 (quoting Urvashi
Vaid, then Executive Director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force), re-
printed in GRoss, supra note 3, at 220.
42. Yes Sir:I'm Gay, MAINE, Fall 1992, at 10, 11.
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dark secrets."4 2 On his way to making that statement, he relied on
what he called a "code of silence" in the gay community: "Everyone
knew I was in ROTC and that I was struggling to come to grips with
my sexuality, so they just supported me and were quiet, which was
what I needed."
43
Not everyone benefits from being left to choose her own time
for coming out. Occasionally, people are grateful for having been
involuntarily outed, believing that they were better off than if left to
come out on their own." But most gay people are probably better off
for taking the step on their own, feeling a new measure of self-respect
from the experience of having been the ones who told their parents,
friends, and coworkers. They also get the opportunity to characterize
their sexuality as they wish-as bisexual, for example, if that is how
they view themselves."
Thus, on balance, we believe Mohr'is wrong. He believes that the
convention must be abandoned to prevent the loss of dignity that en-
sues from being forced to keep silent or lie. But a loss of dignity
befalls those of us who keep silent for others only when we do so out
of acceptance of our own worthlessness. If we are keeping silent to
spare others from harm or to let them decide to come out on their
own timetable, then our dignity is not lost; rather, our altruism is es-
pecially morally worthy. Indeed, it is Mohr who risks lacking dignity
if he uses a third person for his own end of shoring up his sense of
worth.46
42. YesSir:I'm Gay, MAINE, Fall 1992, at 10, 11.
43. Yes Sir: I'm Gay, supra note 42, at 10, 11.
44. In his book, Mohr gives the single extended example of Congressman Gerry Studds
of Massachusetts. Studds, he relates, was outed under deeply embarrassing circum-
stances, when it was revealed that he had had sex a decade earlier with a young man
who was working as a page in the House of Representatives. Studds said after being
outed, however, that he felt "'[b]etter than I've ever felt in my life.'" See MOHR, su-
pra note 20, at 41-43. We too know from our own experience of a few others outed
in adverse circumstances who quickly came to see it as a blessing, but, like Mohr, we
are white, male, and comparatively privileged. Mohr never acknowledges that the
dignity of others may be more fragile and harder to resuscitate than that of Gerry
Studds.
45. SeeCard, supranote 17, at 211.
46. His notion of personal dignity seems to draw on Kantian' metaphysics. Yet Kant be-
lieved that one must always treat others as an "end" in themselves not as a "means"
for our own ends. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE Mer'gSvscs
OF MoRALs (3d ed., 1993).
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IV. THE FuTuRE OF THE CONVENTION
In most discussions about outing, people take one of two posi-
tions. Some people believe outing is always justified as a way of "living
in the truth." Others believe that outing is never justified, or that it is
justified only when the outed person has caused affirmative harms to
other gays. We hope that this essay has demonstrated the high costs of
both these positions. Both telling lies and speaking truths can cause
harm. Are there any middle grounds that might serve as alternatives?
Two possibilities occur to us. First, a convention of silence would
be retained but would be applied in a somewhat narrower range of
cases than it is currently. As we have reported above, we are already
seeing an erosion of the convention today in communities in which
gay men and lesbians have supportive and discreet straight friends
they feel comfortable talking to about closeted acquaintances. A fur-
ther erosion might be more dramatic, leading to disclosures to straight
people not certain to be supportive.
We have argued that protective silence is justified for two reasons
only: in order to protect lesbians and gay men from significant harms
and in order to give them ample time to come out. If other gay men
and lesbians come to accept these purposes, then they might in the
future cease lying on behalf of persons who fit into neither of these
categories. They might, that is, cease to lie on behalf of the privileged
gay men and lesbians (and most of us know some) who are unlikely to
suffer any serious harms if they were known to be gay and yet have
ceased altogether to consider making their sexuality known to nongay
people. They include, for example, the fictional well-heeled men on
the "A-list" in Armistead Maupin's Tales of the City,47 who reap the
benefits of the gay world that those who are out have worked to cre-
ate, but who are unwilling to pay even any minor price.4 For men like
them, gay men and lesbians might cease to be silent. On the other
hand, for Sipple and the large numbers of closeted persons who might
suffer harms or who are struggling with the decision to come out, they
would keep silent or lie just as they do today.
47. AmisrEAD MAuPiN, TALES OF THE Cr (1978).
48. Maupin has written a series of books on life in San Francisco. In some of them, he
describes a group of financially secure gay men who socialize together, but keep their
sexuality hidden from heterosexuals. See id.
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This new position is attractive in principle but unworkable in
practice. A gay person who is out is rarely in a position to assess the
magnitude of harm any particular closeted individual faces or the seri-
ousness of the individual's internal struggle toward coming out.
(Indeed, if he knew the closeted person well enough to know the an-
swers to these questions, he would probably consider himself in the
position of a friend, bound by other obligations of loyalty not to re-
veal what the closeted person would not want revealed, even if he
thought his friend unjustified in staying in hiding.)
A second possible middle ground is at once more gentle and
more forceful. Gay men and lesbians would adhere to the convention,
but become more aggressive about urging closeted persons to reveal
themselves. They would continue to let the young student at the Uni-
versity of Maine come out slowly to other gay men and lesbians and
find his own way to the commander's office. They would let Sipple
talk to his family on his own time. They would even keep silent for
the A-list men. But they would be more assertive in their conversa-
tions with their closeted friends.
Today, two gay persons who are getting to know each other often
ask how out the other person is-are you out at work? Out to your
straight friends? Out to your parents? These are important conversa-
tions, since just asking the questions keeps the issues alive for the
hearer. The closeted person when asked today often feels the need to
justify why he or she has chosen not to tell her co-workers or her par-
ents.
In the future, as they resist the convention more, and as they feel
more self-assured in being out, gay people may have even more of
these conversations. More and more often, when people admit that
they are not out in some context, other gay people may begin to ask
"why not?" Openly gay people may press the closeted to talk about the
harms they foresee, for, though many are serious and probable, others
once examined may seem less costly than the harms of staying per-
petually in hiding. They may confront the closeted people with the
costs to the rest of us, as individuals and as members of a community
of lying on their behalf.
Such a change in the future may seem modest, but it would rest
on a fundamental shift in the relationship of gay people to the con-
vention, a change that we believe is desirable. Today, as we have
related, gay people tend to speak of outness and closetedness as if they
were purely individual matters: "I'm not going to tell her how out she
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has to be," or, alternatively, "No one can tell me how out to be." To-
morrow, gay people may increasingly insist that any individual's
outness or closetedness is an issue that matters to other gay and lesbian
people, at the least because it dictates what they themselves may and
may not talk about. Gay people who are out may thus work toward
changing the atmosphere of their silence. They may stop thinking and
stop conveying that the closeted have a "right" to our silence. They
may convey instead that our silence and our lies are acts of charity that
flow from sympathy and affection, and that those who are in the
closet have responsibilities to those who have been protecting them,
and to those who are yet to be born. t

